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MRS. NOBLE'S SEPARATE TORT ACTION WAS NOT TRIED WITH 
THE DIVORCE, NOR WERE TORT DAMAGES AWARDED IN THE DIVORCE, 
Respondent's Brief urges this court to apply res "judicata to 
bar Mrs. Noble's separate tort action, arguing that the tort 
action was effectively tried in the divorce and the divorce 
court's alimony and property division were specifically premised 
upon the personal injury. Respondent's Brief at 10. 
Respondent's assertions are not supported by case law, nor 
by Judge Tibbs' comments in the divorce action, nor by the actual 
outcome of the divorce. 
There is no case law in support of respondent's positions as 
applied to the case at bar. None of the cases recited in 
respondent's brief suoports his positions in the context of this 
case. 
Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199 (9th 
Cir. 1982), does identify, as one of several factors to be 
considered in applying res judicata, whether a different judgment 
in the second action would destroy or impair an interest 
established by the first case. 681 F.2d at 1201. However, in 
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the present case, this factor should not be considered because no 
rights or interests were established by the divorce decree which 
could be impaired by the tort action. The findings and holdings 
of the divorce court were favorable to Mrs. Noble, not to 
respondent. Further, the property awarded to Mr. Noble was not 
Given free and clear of any claims by Mrs. Noble as judgment 
creditor should she prevail in her tort action. For these 
reasons, Costantini does not suggest that res judicata should be 
applied in the present case. 
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 4 52 U.S. 3 94, 
101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Fd.2d 103 (1981) simply does not hold nor 
suggest, as alleged by respondent, that "claim preclusion bars a 
second action that had any part of the claim determined in the 
original action." Respondent!s grief at 8. On the contrary, res 
judicata may be applied only if the causes of action are the 
same. Schaer v. State by and through the Utah Department of 
Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983). 
In Hall v. Hall, 455 So.2d 813 (Ala. 1984), cited in 
respondent's brief at page 8-9, the defendant ex-husband 
attempted unsuccessfully to convince both the trial court and 
the Alabama supreme court that res judicata should be applied to 
bar his ex-wife's tort action. 455 So.2d at 815. Neither court 
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aqreed with the husbandf and res judicata was not relied upon nor 
discussed bv either court in dismissinq the second action. Td. 
Respondent also relies upon Coughlin v. Christoffersen, 431 
P.2d 997 (Wash. 1967). Respondent's Rrief at 9-10. In that 
case, plaintiff sued her ex-husband manv years after their 
divorce was final, alleqinq that he had defamed her and alienated 
her children. 431 P.?d at 998. Without any discussion, the 
Washington supreme court summarily dismissed these claims, 
concluding that they were heard and disposed of in the divorce 
decree. I£. Assuming that conclusion was correct, it 
distinguishes Coughlin from the present case, because 
Mrs. Noble's tort claims were neither heard nor disposed of in 
the divorce action. On the contrary, the record reflects that 
the divorce judqe kept the two actions separate and tried only 
the divorce case. Under Utah law, he was required to do just 
that. Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah ]983); Walther 
v. Walther, "709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985). 
At a hearing on January 23, 1984, Judqe Tibbs nave the 
parties his rulinq in the divorce action. At the end of this 
hearinq, Judqe Tibbs made the record clear that he had not heard 
nor disposed of the tort action with the divorce: 
"The court finds that there is a civil action for tort 
pendinq and that I have not taken that into consideration as 
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far as my order in thisf but I haven't qot into that 
and I have not considered that for the purpose of makinq 
this decision," 
D.R. at 186; see also Findinas of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
par. 28, D.R. at 149. 
At the hearina on April 13, 1984, referred to on paqes 10-13 
of respondent's brief, Judge Tibbs specifically rejected the 
contention of respondent's counsel that the divorce case should 
preclude the tort action: 
"The Court: I don't think Tthe divorcel is dispositive 
of the other lawsuit. I didn't say it was dispositive of 
the other lawsuit. I said that I have jurisidiction between 
these parties, they have qot "X" amount of property, they 
have conducted themselves toward each other in a certain 
way, and I have dissolved their marriage." 
D.R. at 298. 
Later in the same hearinq, Judqe Tibbs made his position 
clear: 
"I am not going to make a findinq eliminatinq that 
court action. Now, you can start riqht off on that basis 
because both parties were in the position, they stayed in 
that position throuqhout the trial, and I just don't 
feel that that should be mv responsibility, period. I don't 
think with the Supreme Court decision I have the riqht to." 
D.P. at 307. 
Judge Tibbs' position, as revealed at the hearing on April 
13, 1984, was that he had decided only the divorce, not the tort, 
and that he would not make a findinq of fact which would allow 
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the divorce case to preclude the tort action. 
Finally, both the conduct and outcome of the divorce trial 
reflected an intent not to dispose of the tort action. There was 
no request for nor award of money or property as compensation for 
physical pain and suffering, mental and emotional distress, 
humiliation, fear and anxiety, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment 
of life, medical costs or punitive damages. See J. Tibbs' 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, D.R. 138-150. Rather 
than considering the injuries and needs onlv of the injured 
party, as would be the case in a tort action, the court received 
and considered evidence relating to all the eauiti^s of the case, 
including the health, circumstances and needs of both parties. 
Id.; see also D.R. at 307-308. Nor was a jury called to decide 
issues of liability and damages, as would be expected in a tort 
case. 
Res judicata does not apply to bar Mrs. Noble's separate 
tort action. Divorce and personal injury are not the same cause 
of action, nor are they made so merely by the fact that a tragic 
shooting figures prominently in both. The doctrine of collateral 
estoppel may bar particular issues from relitigation in 
Mrs. Noble's separate tort action, but the doctrine of res 
judicata cannot be used to bar the entire action. 
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II. 
THE ISSUE OF THE INTENTIONAL SHOOTING WAS FULLY ADJUDICATED IN 
THE DIVORCE AND WAS NOT APPEALED AND SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM 
RELITIGATION IN THE TORT ACTION BY THE DOCTRINE 
OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
In the divorce action, Mrs. Noble counterclaimed for divorce 
on the qrounds of cruel treatment, in that her husband used 
intoxicants in excess and intentionally shot her in the head with 
a .22 rifle. Both these issues were in controversy between the 
parties at trial, and both received careful attention from the 
trial court. D.R. at 297, 301. Specific findinqs of fact in 
favor of Mrs. Noble were made in the divorce court, findino that 
Mr. Noble did use intoxicants in excess and did intentionally, 
willfully and without just cause shoot his wife in the head. 
D.R. at 139-340. 
When Mr. Noble appealed from the divorce decree, he allowed 
both these findinqs to stand unchallenqed and unauestioned. See 
Appellant's Docketinq Statement and Apoellant's Brief, in Appeal 
No. 19934. 
Now, however, Mr. Noble seeks to avoid collateral estoppel 
effect from the findinq of an intentional shootinq, not on the 
qrounds that the issue was not fairly tried or actuallv and 
specifically decided in the divorce action, but upon the qrounds 
that it was one of two alternate reasons for qrantinq Mrs. Noble 
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a divorce. Respondent's Brief at 27-30. 
Authority for respondent's position rests upon a sinqle 
leading case: Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102 (2nd 
Cir. 1970). See IP Moore's Federal Practice, Paragraph 
0.443[5.-21, at 790-792 (19R4). 
Halpern v. Schwartz was a case of involuntary bankruptcy 
against a husband, wife and son. Thev were declared bankrupt on 
the basis of any of three alternate grounds, the last of which 
was an actual intent to defraud their creditors. 4?6 F.2d at 
103. This last ground was applied to the wife even though she 
had never testified and her interest in the business was 
minimal. 1(3. at 103, 105. When she later sought discharge from 
bankruptcy, the trustee in bankruptcy successfully opposed her 
motion on the grounds that discharge cannot be granted where 
there was an actual intent to defraud creditors. The lower court 
held that the issue of actual intent to defraud had been decided 
already in the original bankruptcy proceedinq, and was barred by 
collateral estoppel from relitigation in the discharge 
proceedinq. Id_. at 104. 
On appeal, the circuit court of appeals reversed holding 
that, under the circumstances presented, the finding of actual 
intent was simply not necessary to the prior adjudication. 





 ^alpem case has twice been rejected by the Second 
Circuit as a qeneral qoverninq rule. Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 
1143, 1154 (2nd Cir. 1977); and Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 
46, 67 (2nd Cir. 3978). Further, no other court of appeals 
has adopted the Halpern position without qualification. 1R 
Moore's Federal Practice, Paraqraph 0.443 [5.-21, at 791 (1^84). 
Professor Moore himself analyzed the Halpern case as 
follows: 
"The Halpern case was a very appealinq case, and 
probably it was correctly decided. It was not, however, a 
good case for the announcement of qeneral doctrine, and, 
with deference, we believe that the caution with which it 
has been received by other panels of the same court, and by 
other courts, is fully justified, and its translation into a 
quidinq principal by the Restatement was unfortunate. 
* * * 
In sum, thouqh there may be cases in which the 
alternative or cumulative nature of the qrounds on which 
judqment is rendered may properly be a factor in determining 
whether stranger estoppel is fair, and in very unusual cases 
like Halpern denial of the estoppel mav be justified, 
abandonment of estoppel on the mere circumstance that the 
judqment rests on multiple qrounds is not called for and 
would be totally out of keeping with the developed law in 
the federal courts that one full and fair opportunity to 
litigate is enough." 
IB Moore's Federal Practice, Paragraph 0.443[5.-21, at 792-793 
(1984) (emphasis added). 
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Even if the Halpern rule were accepted by the majority of 
courts, which it is not, it should not be applied to the case at 
bar. 
In Williams v. Ward, supra, the court held that alternative 
grounds for judgment in one case should not be deprived of 
collateral estoppel effect in another case, where the party 
seeking to avoid collateral estoppel was involved in both actions 
simultaneously and thus could fully anticipate the potential 
barring effect of the earlier judgment. S56 F.2d at 1154. 
The same rule was adopted by the court in In re Dalkon 
Shield Punitive Damages Litigation, 613 F.Supp. 1112 
(E.D.Va. 1985), where the court observed that when the original 
action and the action in which preclusion is sought were pending 
simultaneously, alternative grounds for the first judgment should 
all be given collateral estoppel effect in the second because the 
possible preclusive effects were readily foreseeable when the 
first action was being litigated. 613 F.Supp. 1117. 
In the present case, Mrs. Noble's tort action was filed on 
March 16, 1982, lonq before a decision was reached in the 
divorce case. P.I.R. at 88. As the divorce case progressed 
towards trial, it was readilv apparent to all parties that the 
liability issue in the tort action was exactly the same as the 
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fault issue in the divorce case. Respondent and his counsel 
fully appreciated the res judicata and collateral estoppel 
effects inherent in the situation. D.R. at 298. Yet, they 
failed to appeal the adverse decision rendered against them in 
the divorce action. 
Respondent has had a full and fair ooportunity to litinate 
an issue which he knew was siqnificant in another case then 
pending between the same two parties. Having lost in the first 
case, he should not be allowed to relitiqate the same issue in 
the second case. 
III. 
YOUNG v. HANSEN SHOULD NOT BE OVERRULED 
Respondent urges this court to overrule Young v. Hansen, 
118 Utah 1, 218 P.2d 675 (1950), which established the rule in 
Utah that judgments on appeal have no res judicata effect. 
Respondent relies primarily upon Federated Department 
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, supra, in support of his position that a 
judgment on appeal should be given res judicata effect despite 
the fact that it may be reversed or modified. See Respondent's 
Brief at 20-23. 
However, a closer look at Moitie reveals a fact pattern 
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significantly different from the facts at bar: the party which 
lost the case failed to appeal it, but durinq the pendency of an 
appeal by other parties, filed basically the same action in a 
state court. 452 U.S. at 3^6. 
Tn this type of fact situation where the losinq party seeks 
to avoid the decision by initiatinq a second action basically 
identical to the first, allowinq res judicata effect to the 
judgment is justified by the need to prevent abuse of the 
court system. 
The facts in the present case are sinnificantly different. 
In this case, the party which lost the judqment contested it and 
appealed it, but at the same time, has souqht to employ it as a 
bar. Research has not revealed a single case in which res 
judicata effect was allowed in such a situation. It would 
certainly be inequitable to allow the respondent to employ 
as a bar a judqment which he is at the same time contestinq on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Res judicata should not bar Mrs. Noble's separate tort 
action. Res judicata is only used to bar an identical cause of 
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action from being relitiqatedf and tort and divorce are not the 
same cause of action. In the present case, the conduct and 
outcome of the divorce reflect an intent not to hear and dispose 
of the tort action in the divorce. 
Respondent had a full and fair opportunity in the divorce 
case to litigate the issue of whether he intentionally shot his 
wife. He knew at the time that the same issue would finure 
prominently in the tort case. After careful consideration of all 
the evidence, Judge Tibbs ruled against respondent on that issue, 
yet respondent failed to appeal that rulina. Judae Tibbs1 ruling 
should be considered final for purooses of barring relitigation 
of the same issue in the tort action. 
The rule in Young v. Hansen, that a judgment on appeal is 
not final as a complete bar to a second action, is appropriate to 
the facts of this case, and should be applied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of May, 1986. 
W. EUGENE/HANSEN 
HANSEN S i)EWSNUP 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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